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VEILED IMPUNITY: IRAN'S USE OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
KEITH A. PETTY*




In December of 2006, thousands of Hezbollah supporters crowded the streets
of Beirut, angrily demanding that Prime Minister Siniora's government step down.
This followed several months after armed members of Hezbollah crossed the
Lebanese border into Israel and murdered three Israeli soldiers and kidnapped two
others, precipitating the July War of 2006. In Iraq, Shi'a death squads - including
members of Muqtada al-Sadr's militia - roam the streets of Baghdad, murdering
Sunni Arabs and suspected collaborators of the U.S. led coalition. They, along
with well placed Sadr supporters in the Iraqi government, seek to change the shape
of the political landscape in Iraq, guaranteeing Shi'a dominance. In the Gaza Strip
in June 2006, members of Hamas crossed underground into Israel, killed two
Israeli soldiers, and kidnapped a third. Only six months prior to this, Hamas won a
landslide victory in parliamentary elections. Each of these groups - Hezbollah,
Mahdi's Army, and Hamas - is a non-state armed group that is financially,
politically, and ideologically supported by Iran. As such, their actions may be
attributed to Iran.
Iranian support of non-state armed groups is not limited to the three groups
listed above. In fact, Iran provides support to groups all over the world in what has
become a cornerstone of its foreign policy. By supporting these groups, Iran seeks
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to accomplish multiple objectives, including: increasing Iranian influence in the
Middle East while limiting Sunni Arab influence, destroying Israel, and limiting or
eliminating U.S. influence in the region.
The level of sophistication of Iran's approach to indirect aggression is
particularly noteworthy. Rather than using their own armed forces and engaging in
open hostilities with adversaries, Iran cultivates non-state armed groups within the
territory of, or directly adjacent to, other States. These non-state armed groups
develop parallel military and political branches to rival the target State they seek to
destabilize or overthrow. Iranian-backed armed groups are not limited, as are other
State sponsored groups, to the blunt use of force to achieve its strategic objectives.
Surprisingly, Iran's use of non-state armed groups as an extension of its
foreign policy has not met significant deterrence. Many still believe that
aggression can only be committed when a State openly attacks another State with
military force, a misperception ofjus ad bellum law. This paper suggests a closer
analysis of what constitutes unlawful aggression under international law.
Specifically, the issue is whether State support of non-state armed groups as a
means of threatening the territorial integrity or political independence of another
State constitutes unlawful aggression.
Several aspects of Iran's involvement with non-state armed groups must be
discussed before reaching these determinations. The general framework of these
groups and a detailed discussion of Iran's support to Hezbollah, Iraqi insurgents,
and Hamas are found in Section II. Iran's strategic objectives as well as its
sophisticated use of armed groups are discussed in Section III. Whether Iran's use
of non-state armed groups against target States amounts to aggression is analyzed
in Section IV. The final section, Section V, provides recommendations and
conclusions for policy and law-makers interested in deterring Iran's use of armed
groups as a means of foreign policy.
II. THE UNLAWFUL NATURE OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS & IRANIAN SUPPORT
Iran is responsible, financially and materially, for a new Shi'a strength in the
Middle East due largely to its support of non-state armed groups.2 Jordan's King
Abdullah voiced concern over Iran's new "crescent" of influence running from
Tehran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.3 This is a sentiment shared by many
Arab leaders, including King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak.4
Non-state armed groups can be categorized into four different groups:
insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations.5 The emergence of the
increased capabilities of armed groups to attack States in the post-Cold War era




5. RICHARD H. SHULTZ, JR. ET AL., ARMED GROUPS: A TIER-ONE SECURITY THREAT, U.S. AIR
FORCE INST. FOR NAT'L SEC. STUD. 16, INSS Occasional Paper 57 (2004), available at
http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/ocp57.pdf [hereinafter SHULTZ, TIER ONE].
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had a powerful impact on the State system. 6 Similarly, Iran's use of these groups
introduces a new threat within that paradigm. Iran exploits four of the basic
characteristics of non-state armed groups to achieve its strategic goals. These
characteristics include: challenging the legitimacy of the State, using force as a
primary instrument, maintaining local and global capabilities, and failing to
recognize democratic principles and the rule of law.7 Iran, however, changes this
dynamic by using armed groups to undermine State legitimacy through methods
other than the open use of force.
Historically, armed groups have used force as their primary method of
threatening a State's political independence. In 1977, the United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council condemned the unlawful aggression committed by mercenaries
against the Republic of Benin. 8 While direct attacks against a State are sometimes
committed, these groups tend to employ indirect and prolonged violence to exert
their influence. This is the case in Colombia, Lebanon, and the Philippines. 9
Some non-state armed groups attempt to legitimize their efforts by
establishing a political wing and by providing public services. This can result in a
State within a State, as was the case of the Maoist Rebels in Nepal. 10 Of these
attempts at legitimacy, one expert comments:
It is true that some armed groups maintain political and paramilitary
wings and that the former may, for tactical reasons, eschew violence.
Still, the use of force is a critical instrument for these organizations,
regardless of how they may seek to mask that fact. Violence is used
instrumentally to achieve political and/or other objectives. 1
In his article, "Era of Armed Groups," Richard H. Schultz discusses six
defining aspects of armed groups. They are: leadership, rank and file membership,
organizational structure and functions, an ideology or political code of beliefs and
objectives, strategy and tactics, and links with other non-state and State actors.
12
The following Section focuses on the last of these, namely, Iran's ties to non-state
armed groups.
A. Hezbollah, Iraqi Insurgents, & Hamas
Typically, non-state armed groups are used by States to supplement regular
armed forces. Iran, however, uses non-state armed groups as a central component
of its foreign policy. 13 By providing these groups with a combination of political,
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 13-17.
8. S.C. Res. 405, U.N. Doc. S/RES/405 (Apr. 14, 1977).
9. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Era Of Armed Groups, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE 1, 1 (2005) [hereinafter Shultz, Armed Groups].
10. IRINNEWS.ORG, Nepal: Rebels accused of running parallel government, Sept. 14, 2006,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=61695; See also BBCNEwS, Nepal Maoists Disband
Government, Jan. 18, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/sout-asia/6273535.stm.
11. Shultz, Armed Groups, supra note 9, at 10.
12. Id.
13. See James M. O'Brien, Exporting Jihad: Iran's Use of Non-State Armed Groups 3 (Mar. 29,
2006) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Tufts University) (on file with The Fletcher School, Tufts University).
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ideological, financial, and military backing, Iran exercises a unique sophistication
in threatening the political independence of States. Rather than using direct force -
and not as innocuous as winning elections - these groups undermine the legitimacy
of recognized governments through their actions. 1
4
Some of the groups that Iran supports include: the Armed Islamic Group in
Algeria, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Islamic
Courts in Somalia, and several insurgent groups in Iraq such as the Badr
Organization and Mahdi's Army. For the purpose of brevity, this paper will limit
its focus to Hezbollah, Mahdi's Army and the Badr Organization in Iraq, and
Hamas.
B. Hezbollah: A Threat to International Law & Politics
The most prominent non-state armed group backed by Iran is the Lebanon-
based Hezbollah organization, designated by the U.S. Department of State as a
foreign terrorist organization.' 5  But to categorize Hezbollah merely as an
organization that commits acts of terrorism is to overlook its dual threat to regional
stability - the military and political aspects of the organization. 16 Members of
Hezbollah's political wing hold seats in the Lebanese parliament and serve in
Prime Minister Siniora's cabinet. The organization also maintains social
institutions and provides basic services for southern Lebanon. In fact, it is a
parallel political and military organization to Lebanon's duly elected
government. 17
Hezbollah was Iran's first use of a non-state armed group to achieve its
strategic goals. 8 Closely following the aftermath of Iran's revolution several
years before, Hezbollah was created in 1982 as a result of Israel's invasion of
Lebanon.19 Its ideology consisted of protecting the Lebanese Shi'a population
from Israeli occupation and expanding Iran's brand of Shi'a extremism.
During the Lebanese Civil War, Hezbollah carried out attacks against Israeli,
Western, and other targets suggesting Iranian involvement. These attacks include:
the 1983 suicide bombings of French Headquarters and U.S. Marine barracks in
Beirut, killing 58 French soldiers and 241 Marines; the 1984 hijacking of an Air
France passenger jet; and the 1988 bombing near Saudi Arabian Airlines offices in
Kuwait City - likely a result of Saudi Arabia's severance of diplomatic ties with
Iran just weeks before.2 °
14. Id. at 91-95.
15. OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, FACT SHEET: FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191 .htm.
16. See O'Brien, supra note 13, at 93-95.
17. Susan Sachs, Hezbollah Offers a Helping Hand in Southern Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
2000, at A3.
18. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 58.
19. CNN.COM, Hezbollah: Violence mixed with social mission, July 17, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/13/hezbollah/index.html.
20. ELY KARMON, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y, 'FIGHT ON ALL FRONTS': HIZBALLAH,
THE WAR ON TERROR, AND THE WAR IN IRAQ 4-11, Policy Focus No. 45 (Dec. 2003).
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Following the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1989, Hezbollah was permitted
to keep its arms under the Taif Accord in order to continue fighting the Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon. 21 During the 1990s, Hezbollah's leader, Sheikh
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, developed the organization into a more effective
fighting force with international reach.
22 Under his leadership, Hezbollah's
network has conducted attacks or operations in Saudi Arabia, South America,
Canada, Sweden, and several Asian States. 23 These attacks are closely linked to
Iran.24
In spite of Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah
retained its militant wing.25 In fact, they stockpiled thousands of medium and long
range rockets and missiles, and continued lending operational support to the
Palestinian intifada.26 Hezbollah claims it cannot disarm since it is responsible for
preventing further attacks by Israel.
27
Today, the Lebanese government refuses to seize Hezbollah's assets or arms
despite U.S. pressure, claiming they are a legitimate resistance movement and
political party.28 This unwillingness to disarm is in direct contravention of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1559.29
The July War of 2006, initiated by Hezbollah against Israel, demonstrated
Hezbollah's current political and military strength. First, it was evident that, while
smaller in size, Hezbollah is a formidable force against stronger adversaries,
including the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).3° Second, it showed that Lebanon does
not have the military strength or political capital to reign in Hezbollah if it truly
wanted to. 31 Finally, Hezbollah enjoys unwavering popular support from large
parts of Lebanon, particularly the Lebanese Shi'a community.32
21. ANDREW EXUM, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y, HIZBALLAH AT WAR: A MILITARY
ASSESSMENT 2, Policy Focus No. 63 (Dec. 2006) [hereinafter HIZBALLAH AT WAR].
22. See id.
23. KARMON, supra note 20, at 9-11. Hezbollah was responsible for the terror attacks in Buenos
Aires in 1992 and 1994 and the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, which housed
a U.S. military complex. Hezbollah's international operations also extend to the "tri-border area",
where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay share a border. Also, Hezbollah cells in Colombia are known to
use drug trafficking and contraband networks to launder funds later used to finance terrorism. Id. at 2,
9-10. See also SHULTZ, TIER ONE, supra note 5, at 59-61.
24. Matthew Levitt, Lecture at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Iran and Syria: State
Sponsorship in the Age of Terror Networks (Mar. 7, 2005) (transcript available at the website of the
Wash. Inst. for Near East Policy., http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=230.).
25. HIZBALLAH AT WAR, supra note 21, at 2.
26. See KARMON, supra note 20, at 24.
27. Graham E. Fuller, The Hizballah-Iran Connection: Modelfor Sunni Resistance, 30 WASH. Q.
139, 144 (Winter 2006-2007). Hezbollah also claims that its military wing is necessary to liberate the
small territory known as Shebaa Farms, which is occupied by Israel, recognized as Syrian, but claimed
by Lebanon. Id.
28. KARMON, supra note 20, at 23.
29. S.C. Res. 1559, 1 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1559 (Sept. 2, 2004).
30. See HIZBALLAH AT WAR, supra note 21, at 5.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Hussein Dakroub, Hezbollah allies claim win in Lebanon, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 6, 2005.
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The strength of Hezbollah's political wing should not be underestimated. In
June of 2005, Hezbollah won all 23 seats available in Parliament for the southern
portion of Lebanon. 33 As a result, Hezbollah has gained some legitimacy in the
international community. While some States categorize Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization (U.S. and Australia), others, at least partially, recognize the political
wing (U.K.). 34 To date, the United Nations and the European Union have also not
designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.35
Hezbollah's political power is a direct threat to the established Lebanese
government. If it were to continue its social services in the South and limit its
actions to those of a traditional political party, there would be little concern.
However, Hezbollah's motives have never been so benign. Although peaceful, the
protests held in Beirut in December 2006 were a precursor to what could be more
coercive means to remove Prime Minister Siniora's government.36 In fact,
Hezbollah and its political allies continue to demand a greater voice in Siniora's
cabinet." 7 Some claim the political standoff is partly a remnant of sectarian
divisions unresolved since the civil war,38 and partly a result of pro-U.S. officials
(Siniora) pitted against pro-Iranian and Syrian groups (Hezbollah).
39
The recent moves by Hezbollah to seize more control in Beirut must be
viewed in light of Iranian support. Martin Kramer, adding to a quote from Richard
Armitage, stated, "If Hezbollah is the A-team [of terrorism], Iran is the team owner
and Syria is the coach."4 °  Iran offers a full range of support to Hezbollah,
including political, economic, and military assistance.4  The relationship between
the two could not be more clear. At a meeting with Iranian Supreme Leader
Khamenei in 2001, Nasrallah publicly kissed Khamenei's hand - a sign among
Shi'a Muslims that Nasrallah accepts Khamenei as his leader.42
Without Iran's financial and military assistance, Hezbollah would not be the
organization it is today. Iran provides Hezbollah with at least $100 million per
year,43 and has also provided approximately 11,000 rockets to their arsenal."
33. Id.
34. Nigel Brew, Def. and Trade Group, Foreign Affairs, Hezbollah in Profile, Parliament of
Australia, Research Note no. 42 2002-03, June 2, 2003, http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/Pubs/m/2002-
03/03m42.htm.
35. Id.
36. Anthony Shadid, Protest Crowds Surge as Beirut Braces for Next Step, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,
2006, at A13.
37. Id.
38. Tensions between Sunni and Shia in Lebanon were relatively calm until the assassination of
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a respected Sunni leader. Sunni's blame one of Hezbollah's key
sponsors, Syria, for the killing. See Ghosh, supra note 2.
39. Shadid, supra note 36.
40. KARMON, supra note 20, at 49 (citing Martin Kramer, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars Conference: The Terrorism of Hizbollah: Ideology, Scope, Threat
(Jan. 16, 2003)).
41. KARMON, supra note 20, at 17.
42. Mehdi Khalaji, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y, Iran's Shadow Government in Lebanon,
PolicyWatch No. 1124 (July 19, 2006) [hereinafter Iran's Shadow Government].
43. David Makovsky, Iran's Hand in Lebanon, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 23, 2006, at G-1.
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Beyond merely giving arms and equipment, Iran provides the expertise of its
special forces. Since Hezbollah's founding, its members have conducted regular
training exercises with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).45
Conversely, Hezbollah's achievements have helped strengthen the hardliners
in Iran who actively engage in anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli policies.46 The 2000
Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the de facto victory of Hezbollah in
the July War of 2006 have emboldened Tehran.47 Analysts agree that Iran pushed
for Hezbollah and Hamas to instigate a confrontation with Israel in 2006 in order
to draw attention away from increased international pressure on their nuclear
ambitions. 48 Even the former Hezbollah Secretary General, Sheik Sobhi Tufeili,
claims Hezbollah has now become a pawn to Iran.49
Iran's use of Hezbollah as an extension of its foreign policy allows a great
deal of strategic flexibility. This is due, in large part, to Hezbollah's ability to
ignore international law with relative impunity. Hezbollah regularly engages in
terrorism, criminal enterprises, and violates the laws of war.5° Furthermore,
Hezbollah directly violates the mandate of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559
by maintaining its militant wing. This resolution calls for the removal of all
foreign troops from Lebanon and disarmament of all militia. 51 Resolution 1559
has had little influence over the status of Hezbollah's arms and has done nothing to
stop outside support from both Syria and Iran.
52
This unwavering support translates into political capital for Hezbollah.
Flexing its political muscle, Hezbollah influenced the Siniora government after the
Cedar Revolution of 2004, which effectively ousted Syrian troops from Lebanese
soil. Shortly after the Cedar Revolution, Hassan Nasrallah arranged for three of
his party members to be part of the Siniora cabinet, all while Hezbollah kept its
strategic relationship with Syria. 53  Over the next six months, politicians and
journalists who supported the Cedar Revolution were assassinated via car bombs.1
4
Analysts believe this was to demonstrate to the anti-Syrian politicians in Lebanon
that there would be no obstructing Iranian-Syrian assistance to Hezbollah.55 This
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. KARMON, supra note 20, at 17.
47. Posting by Walid Phares to Counterterrorism Blog, Hizbollah's Iranian War in Lebanon,
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/07/hizbollahsiranian-war in-leba.php (July 22, 2006, 01:50
PM).
48. Id. See also Makovsky, supra note 43.
49. Steve Schippert, Iran Fueling Hamas and Hizballah Toward Conflict, THREATSWATCH.ORG,
Dec. 8, 2006, http://inbrief.threatswatch.org/2006/12/iran-fueling-hamas-and-hizball/.
50. KARMON, supra note 20, at 17.
51. S.C. Res. 1559, 2-3, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1559 (Sept. 2, 2004). See also Adel Darwish,
Hezbullah and Israel: The Proxy War, MIDEASTNEWS, July 2006,
http://www.mideastnews.com/LebanonO6july.html.
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terror seemingly persuaded the Lebanese government to not implement the
measures in Resolution 1559.56
At least one analyst is more concerned with the political and ideological ties
between Hezbollah and Iran than with disbanding Hezbollah's military wing. 57 It
is believed that only total severance with Iran will eliminate Iran's use of
Hezbollah as a threat to the region. Severing these ties, however, will prove
difficult because, in the war of ideas, Hezbollah and Iran clearly have the initiative
in Lebanon.
Ironically, Hezbollah's and Iran's popularity in Lebanon is due more to the
public services they provide than to their collective military strength.58 This stems
from the early 1980s, when Iran first helped Hezbollah build broadcasting,
healthcare, and educational centers. Iran also founded several hospitals and
charitable organizations in southern Lebanon, which work closely with Hezbollah.
With Iran's support, Hezbollah is able to provide for the basic needs of the people
where the Lebanese government cannot.59
Iran is careful to cultivate future relationships as well. Every year hundreds
of Hezbollah affiliated Lebanese students attend political and religious training at
Iranian universities and seminaries.6 0 The faithful Shi'a in Lebanon also have
close ties to Iran. While Ali Hussein al-Sistani is respected as the most important
ayatollah in Shi'a Islam, his presence in Lebanon is limited since he is based in the
holy city of An Najaf, Iraq. In contrast, Iran receives religious taxes from
Lebanese Shiites, and it pays monthly salaries to the Shiite clerics of Lebanon,
thereby securing their loyalty.6'
In addition, Iran is responsible, financially and materially, for a new Shi'a
strength in the region.62 Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran, Syria,
and Hezbollah were able to rely on their close Shi'a ties in the region as a counter
weight to U.S. policy in the region. In fact, many Shi'a organizations in Iraq
already had financial and operational ties to Hezbollah prior to the U.S. invasion.
63
Several years later, after Hezbollah's impressive tactical and strategic successes in
the July War of 2006, many fear that other groups, particularly the Iraqi militias,
will emulate Hezbollah. 64 In fact, Muqtada al-Sadr, radical Shi'a cleric and leader
of Mahdi's Army in Iraq, publicly supported Hezbollah during this conflict, and
56. Id.





62. Ghosh, supra note 2.
63. See KARMON, supra note 20, at 33.
64. Andrew Exum, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POLY, Comparing and Contrasting Hizballah
and Iraq"s Militias, PolicyWatch No. 1197 (Feb. 14, 2007),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateCOS.php?CID=2566.
VOL. 36:2
IRAN'S USE OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
members of the Mahdi Army have allegedly accepted training from Hezbollah in
Lebanon and Iraq.65
C. Iraqi Insurgent Groups: Mahdi's Army & Badr Organization
Iran's support of non-state armed groups profoundly impacts the ongoing
conflict in Iraq. Groups such as Mahdi's Army and the Badr Organization not only
enjoy public support among disenfranchised Shi'a, but also maintain strong
militant forces to combat coalition forces and Sunni insurgents. Each group holds
key positions in the current Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Nouri al
Maliki. Similar to Iran's support of Hezbollah, these organizations operate with
relative impunity, which allows Iran to use them to pursue its strategic objectives
at a safe distance from the law.
The Iraqi insurgent groups most favored by Iran are Mahdi's Army and the
Badr Organization. Mahdi's Army was formed in the summer of 2003 and is
comprised of the armed followers of the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.66 Currently, it is
estimated that its forces are at least several thousand strong. 67  At al-Sadr's
direction, Mahdi's Army commits acts of terrorism and targets U.S., U.K., and
Iraqi forces.68 The fiercest outright clashes between coalition forces and Mahdi's
Army came in April and August 2004.69 The Badr Brigade - later renamed the
Badr Organization - was founded in 1982 as the armed wing of the Supreme
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was established by Iran to
oppose Saddam Hussein's regime.70
Unquestionably, the Iraqi insurgent groups are known violators of the laws of
war. During the standoff with coalition forces in An Najaf in August 2004, al-Sadr
and Mahdi's Army took up fighting positions in and around one of Shi'a Islam's
holiest sites, the Imam Ali mosque. 71 This is a clear violation of international
humanitarian law.7 2  More recently, U.S. and Iraqi forces arrested the deputy
health minister, who is a key member of al-Sadr's Mahdi's Army. He is accused
of aiding militiamen and moving weapons in ambulances.73 Perhaps most
egregious is the ethnic cleansing committed by the "death squads" of both Mahdi's
Army and the Badr Corps. Radical Shi'a elements in the region applaud al-Sadr's
65. Id. at 2.
66. See GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, Al-Mahdi Army /Active Religious Seminary / Al-Sadr's Group,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-sadr.htm.
67. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Mahdi Army,
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?grouplD=4437.
68. GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, supra note 66.
69. See id.
70. KARMON, supra note 20, at 33. See also IRAN Focus, Iran is Behind Badr Brigade in Iraq,
Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=4461.
71. CNN.coM, Who is Muqtada al-Sadr?, Aug. 13, 2004,
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/O8/13/iraq.alsadr/.
72. Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq 73,
HRW Index No. 1564322939, Dec. 2003.
73. BBCNEWS, Top Iraqi Official Held in Raid, Feb. 8, 2007,
http://news.bbe.co.uk/2ihi/middle-east/6341321.stm.
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role in the sectarian conflict in Iraq, where his militia is likely responsible for
thousands of Sunni deaths.7 4
Al-Sadr's political strength is derived from his popular support among the
poor Shi'a in Iraq. Al Sadr's family successfully portrays itself as doing the most
to redress decades of suppression by Sunni muslims under Saddam Hussein's
rule.75 Mahdi's Army wins support in places like Sadr City, a slum in northeast
Baghdad of about two million people. In addition to protection against Sunni
insurgents, they provide basic necessities such as cooking gas, and services like
fixing drains.76  Al-Sadr spends significant resources, donations from his
followers, on orphans and poor families.77 In addition, he has established a
78network of social institutions since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime.
Controlling both the Health and Transportation Ministries facilitates al-Sadr's
legitimate support for his social endeavors. 79 As a result, Sadr City has become a
State within a State, not unlike Hezbollah's influence in southern Lebanon. 0
Today, al-Sadr enjoys considerable political cover. Previous attempts by
coalition forces to target al-Sadr and his Mahdi's Army have been stifled by Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki. 81 In fact, Prime Minister Maliki owes his position to the
swing votes of al-Sadr loyalists in the parliament.
82
Politics have become the favored refuge of Mahdi's Army. It is characteristic
of its members to lie low and return to politics so as not to incur the full wrath of
the coalition. In late January 2007, following President Bush's announcement of
the coalition "surge,"" they did just that. The 30 parliamentary members of the
Sadr bloc returned to politics after a two month boycott.8 4 Many believed this was
to avoid the brunt of the U.S. "surge," while others think al-Sadr is building more
leverage in anticipation of political pressure on his movement.85 Al-Sadr himself,
74. Ghosh, supra note 2.
75. GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, supra note 66.
76. Andrew North, US Seeking Support in Sadr City, BBCNEWS, Mar. 7, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6425171 .stm.
77. Michel Nawfal, Iran and Muqtada al-Sadr's Movement - Driving the Americans Into a
Corner in Iraq, BEIRUT AL-MUSTAQBAL, Apr. 10, 2004 (Open Source Center trans., on file with
author).
78. Id.
79. Jeffrey Bartholet, How Al-Sadr May Control U.S. Fate in Iraq, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 2006,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15898064/site/newsweek/print/l/displaymode/10 98 .
80. North, supra note 76.
81. Id.
82. Bartholet, supra note 79.
83. See President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Jan. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/O1/20070110-7.html [hereinafter President's Address].
84. CNN.com, 25 U.S. troops die on one of deadliest days in Iraq, Jan. 21, 2007,http://Www.cnn-corn/2007/WORLD/meast/01/21/lraq.main/index.html.
85. See Mike Wooldridge, New Pressure on Mehdi Army, BBCNEWS, Jan. 24, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/ 6 2 9 6 0 9 7 .stm.
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however, remains out of the political sphere so he can develop his two-front
strategy: develop his militia while his followers operate in politics.
Iran's support for Shi'a militias was clear in the early stages of the Iraq
conflict. Ayatollah Ali Hossein Khamenei declared on April 11, 2003, that Iran
would not "remain neutral between the Iraqi people and the occupiers. 
,
86
Primarily, Iranian ambitions in Iraq are to protect and promote the interests of the
Shi'a, and frustrate the efforts of the U.S.-led coalition. 87 In spite of the Persian-
Arab divide, Iranian ties to Iraqi Shi'a opposition dates back to the founding of the
SCIRI's militant wing, the Badr Organization, in 1982." 8
As early as April 2004, Iranian diplomatic sources stated that "certain Iranian
circles wish to push the United States into an Iraqi comer to avert any serious U.S.
challenge to Iran in the near future, which is a normal thing to do." 89 The same
source responded to a question about Tehran's link to al-Sadr's group: "The United
States came to Iraq [to put pressure on Iran].... For its part, Iran wishes to see the
United States driven into a comer in Iraq." 90 Al Sadr's movement is a relative
unknown to the U.S. in comparison to other groups in the Iraqi government, both
politically and militarily. It is a "hidden force." 91 Al-Sadr claimed that if Iran
were attacked by the United States, then Mahdi's Army would come to its defense.
Al-Sadr made this announcement from Tehran in 2006.92
There is little doubt that Iran supplies arms and ammunition to Shi'a militias
and is committed to seeing the United States fail in Iraq. 93  Iran provides the
Mahdi's Army and the Badr Organization with weapons, mortar shells, and rocket
propelled grenade (RPG) rounds. 94 British intelligence suggests that the Sadr-led
uprising in Najaf, Basra, and other southern Iraqi cities in 2004 was financed by
Iran.95 Iran once relied exclusively upon the Badr Organization in Iraq, but with
recent support to Mahdi's Army it is uncertain whether this has changed.
96
Nonetheless, it is clear that the Badr Organization at one point received operational
and financial support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in the sum of $3
million per month. 97 In contrast, a Mahdi's Army commander stated that Iran's
help is given to al-Sadr's militia, not because they like them, "but because they
86. KARMON, supra note 20, at 38.
87. Robert Baer, Where's the Smoking Gun on Iran?, TIME.COM, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1588810,00.html [hereinafter Where's the Smoking Gun
on Iran?].
88. KARMON, supra note 20, at 33. See also IRAN Focus, supra note 70.
89. Nawfal, supra note 77.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, 'If they pay we kill them anyway' - the Kidnapper's Story, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 27, 2007, at 1.
93. Where's the Smoking Gun on Iran?, supra note 87.
94. Abdul-Ahad, supra note 92.
95. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Mahdi Army, supra note 67.
96. See Abdul-Ahad, supra note 92.
97. IRANFOCUS, supra note 70.
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hate the U.S." " While Iran supports both organizations, they remain rival
groups.
9 9
In early 2007, the U.S. government took a rare step and openly accused Iran
of providing highly effective roadside bombs to Iraq's militia. It was reported that
the Badr Brigade and Mahdi's Army received and used Explosively Formed
Penetrators (EFPs) and killed about 1780 coalition troops from 2005 to 2006.100
Insurgents also received training on how to implement EFPs in Iranian territory.' 0'
While Iran is generally charged with providing these weapons, the level of
Tehran's direct involvement is unclear. Former U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman General Peter Pace said that these roadside bombs are linked to Iran, but
it is unclear whether top government officials are aware or complicit. 1
02
Because it is given indirectly, Iranian support to Iraq's militia is hard to
detect. American forces arrested and have been holding five IRGC members since
January 11, 2007.103 They claim these five helped the Iraqi opposition target
Americans. However, there is no direct evidence of attacks by the IRGC, largely
because this evidence is so hard to come by. 10 4 This fits Iran's policy of indirect
engagement through non-state armed groups.
Current reports are uncertain as to how deep Iran's connection to Mahdi's
Army is, besides funding and supplying weapons.' °5 What is clear, however, is
that Al Sadr and his militia find sanctuary in Iran. After President Bush announced
the security crackdown in Baghdad 10 6 - or the "surge" - senior Mahdi Army
officials fled to either Syria or Iran.l0 7  Also, Sadr headquarters warned their
supporters to avoid confrontation with the Americans at all cost. 10 8  A senior
advisor to Prime Minister Maliki confirmed that al-Sadr was in Iran. 10 9 This
would not be the first time al-Sadr has met with the hardline Shi'a clerics in
98. Abdul-Ahad, supra note 92.
99. Bartholet, supra note 79.
100. Sharon Behn, 'Rogue' Shi 'ite Militias Using Iranian Bombs, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2007, at
A5. See also Michael R. Gordon, Deadliest Bomb in Iraq is Made by Iran, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2007, at Al; BBCNEwS, US accuses Iran over Iraq Bombs, Feb. 11, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/middle_east/6351257.stm; CNN.coM, Gates: U.S. Has Evidence of Iran
Helping Insurgents, Feb. 9, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/02/09/gates.iraq.iran.ap/index.html.
101. Jaime McIntyre, Iraqi Insurgents Being Trained in Iran, U.S. Says, CNN.COM, Apr. 12, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/04/1 1/iraq.main/index.html.
102. CNN.coM, Top General Casts Doubt on Tehran's Link to Iraq Militias, Feb. 14, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/02/13/pace.iran/ [hereinafter Top General Casts Doubt].
103. Robert Baer, Are the Iranians Out For Revenge?, TIME.CoM, Jan. 30, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1583523,00.htm.
104. See Where's the Smoking Gun on Iran?, supra note 87.
105. See Abdul-Ahad, supra note 92.
106. President's Address 2007, supra note 83.
107. Joshua Partlow & Ernesto Londero, Lie Low, Fighters are Told; 'Try at All Costs' to Avoid
Conflict with Americans, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at A10.
108. Id.
109. BBCNEwS, Radical Shia Cleric 'is in Iran', Feb. 15, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/middleeast/6364193.stm.
VOL. 36:2
IRAN'S USE OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
Iran. 110
Iran's support of non-state armed groups is not limited to religious affiliation.
It also supports groups that share its strategic interests. The following section
discusses one such non-Shi'a group that Iran supports - Hamas.
D. Hamas: Decades of Violence & A Political Coup
Hamas was founded in the 1960s as an outgrowth of the Muslim
Brotherhood.111 Its founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, started the group with non-
violent practices, but he took the group in a more radical, violent direction in the
early 1980s. 112 The Charter of Hamas, released in 1988, leaves no doubt about its
goals, including: dedication to creating an Islamic state in Palestinian territory,
which includes all of modem Israel and the Palestine territories. This necessarily
involves the destruction of Israel through violent jihad, the duty of all Muslims." 3
Hamas frequently uses suicide bombs and rocket attacks to attack civilians
and is violently opposed to a peaceful settlement with Israel. However, popular
support for Hamas is substantial. Armed with significant outside financial support,
the group provides extensive networks of social services in the Palestinian
Territories. 114
The political wing of Hamas won a significant victory in January 2006. In the
parliamentary elections, Hamas won 76 of the 132 seats. "15 In spite of the electoral
victory, Hamas continues its aggressive position toward Israel.
In the fall of 2006, Hamas was engaged in a violent power struggle with its
more moderate rival group, al-Fatah. 116 A power-sharing agreement resulted from
a conference in Mecca. Again, Hamas emerged the victor.1 7 The organization
will essentially maintain its foothold over the security force run by Hamas in Gaza,
as well as key political appointees.1 18 Therefore, both its military and political
wings remain strong.
There is ample evidence that Iran now directly supports Hamas. 119 Iran has
sponsored three conferences relating to support for the second Palestinian Intifada,
in 2001, 2002, and 2006.120 More recently, in December 2006, Prime Minister
Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas) was in Tehran meeting with President Mahmoud
110. See Rowan Scarborough, Iran, Hezbollah Support al-Sadr, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 7,2004, at Al.
111. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Hamas, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=49.
112. Id.
113. See The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, pmbl., intro., arts. 6-7, 11, 13, 15, 33,
Aug. 18, 1988, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm.
114. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Hamas, supra note 111.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Tim McGirk, Hamas Gets the Upper Hand, TIME.COM, Feb. 15, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1590431,00.html.
118. See id.
119. Makovsky, supra note 43.
120. Bill Samii, Iran: Intifada Conference in Tehran Has Multiple Objectives, RADIO FREE
EUROPE, Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/a6170638.c079-4afl-b441-
75dbba236340.html.
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Ahmadinejad. Haniyeh pledged to continue Hamas' violent jihad and refused to
recognize "the Zionist entity" in spite of international pressure to do so. 121
After Hamas won the January 2006 parliamentary elections, the West set out
to isolate the Hamas government by cutting off financial support. 122 Iran quickly
offered to step in and give financial assistance where the United States and the
European Union left off. 123 So far, Iran has given the government at least $120
million in aid since the West cut off financial ties. 124 Iran intends to invest $250
million more in order to upgrade the organization's political and military
capabilities. 125 As the primary supporter of the Hamas government, Iran now has
stronger influence over its political and operational elements.
Military aid is given to Hamas in the form of new technology, training, and
equipment. 126 Iran provides tons of explosives, small arms, and millions of rounds
of ammunition and advanced anti-tank rockets. 127  Under the recently agreed
military arrangement, Iran is also setting up a logistics system for Hamas to help
properly maintain and produce weapons. 128 The aim is to make Hamas as effective
a fighting force as Hezbollah.1
29
Training of Hamas militants occurs in both the Palestinian Territories and
Iran. According to one report, Iranian agents, including a General Officer, were
arrested in Gaza at an Islamic university known to be a Hamas stronghold. The
agents were actively training Hamas activists to make explosives in chemical
labs. 130 Groups of fighters from Gaza also receive training in Syria and Iran at
IRGC bases. 131
Hamas and Iran have reciprocal ties. In 2005, Hamas Chief Khaled Mashaal
vowed that if Iran were attacked by Israel, Hamas would step up attacks. He added
that President Ahmadinejad is courageous for dismissing the holocaust and calling
for Israel to be transplanted to Europe or North America. 132 An Israeli newspaper
121. Schippert, supra note 49.
122. BBCNEwS, Iran Offers Hamas Financial Aid, Feb. 22, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/4739900.stm.
123. Id.
124. Richard Boudreaux, Israeli Oficial Says Iran Training Hamas, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at
7.
125. TEL AvIv YEDI'OT AHARONOT, Israel: Secret Iran-Hamas Agreement to Improve Military
Capabilities, Dec. 2, 2006, at 2 [hereinafter Secret Iran-Hamas Agreement].
126. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Galant Outlines Hamas-Iran Ties, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 7, 2007,
available at
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=l 173173954784&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShow
Full. See also Boudreaux, supra note 124.
127. Schippert, supra note 49.
128. See Secret Iran-Hamas Agreement, supra note 125.
129. See id.
130. Ali Waked, Iranian General Supervised Hamas Arms, Source Says, YNETNEWS.COM, Feb. 2,
2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3360122,00.html. During this raid a Hamas
commander responsible for orchestrating the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier near the Gaza Strip last
June - one of the precipitating moves to the July War of 2006 - suffered injuries. Id.
131. Secret Iran-Hamas Agreement, supra note 125.
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VOL. 36:2
IRAN'S USE OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
reports that, "In effect, the Iran-Hamas agreement constitutes the final and decisive
phase of enlisting Hamas into the broad rejectionist front that Iran is seeking to
establish - a front that already includes Lebanon, Syria, and elements in Iraq."'
' 33
III. IRANIAN OBJECTIVES & TACTICS
Many misinterpret Iran's strategy of using non-state armed groups for erratic
behavior, or "rogue" tendencies. In reality, Iran has a very clear strategic objective
in using non-state armed groups to foment instability, politically and militarily, in
target States. 134 Iran's non-state armed groups' influence is no longer limited to
specific regions; it is now a global threat. While some groups appear to have
divergent interests, each serves Iran's overall policy objectives. 135 This section
reveals that Iran's goals may be similar to other State supporters of insurgent
groups; namely, regional influence and strategic competition, 136 but their tactics
are more sophisticated.
A. Regional Hegemony & Beyond
Iran's goals are clear: increasing Iranian influence in the Middle East while
limiting Sunni Arab influence, destroying Israel, and limiting or eliminating U.S.
influence in the region. The U.S. unwittingly played into Iran's strategic plan by
taking out its two principal rivals in the region - Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and the
Taliban in Afghanistan. Strong allies in Syria and Hezbollah also contribute to
Iran's newfound status in the region. Iran's efforts to go nuclear, if successful,
would undoubtedly send shockwaves through the regional power structure as well.
Destroying Israel and establishing one State in Palestine remains a priority,
and has been at least since the revolution in 1979.137 Iranian support of Hamas, in
spite of the Shi'a-Sunni divide, is a logical extension of this policy. President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is vocal on this point. Shortly after taking office in 2005,
he openly called for Israel to be "wiped off the map."' 138 Following the start of the
July War of 2006, the Iranian paper which most represents the supreme leader
Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hossayni Khamenei's voice, stated:
Wiping out the Zionist regime is not only a religious and national duty
but a humane one... [P]olitical, logistical and arms support for Hamas
and Hezbollah and sending combatants to the front is the minimum cost
that the Islamic countries must pay for safeguarding their security and
independence. 1
39
http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/009426.php (Dec. 15, 2005, 6:40 AM).
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134. DANIEL L. BYMAN ET AL., RAND CORP., IRAN'S SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST-
REVOLUTIONARY ERA 8, MR-1320-OSD (2001).
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In Iraq, support of the Shi'a majority, including SCIRI, the Badr
Organization, and Mahdi's Army, is the easiest way to cripple U.S. policy
objectives. As long as the United States is preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan,
there is little chance that it poses a significant military threat to Iran. Furthermore,
the Islamic Republic cannot be deaf to U.S. public opinion supporting a
withdrawal of forces from Iraq. Critics of the Iraq war are skeptical of the
administration's efforts to link Iran to the Iraqi militias, claiming it is the same
type of hype used prior to the invasion of Iraq. 1
40
Perhaps more disquieting than Iran's objectives are the methods it uses to
achieve them. By undermining existing governments, Iran does not have to fire a
single shot in order to gain regional influence, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq.
Instead, it supports armed groups and their political wings which delegitimize
target States, thereby securing Iranian interests.
B. The Sophisticated Nature of Iranian Support
The methods employed by Iranian-backed armed groups seem to reflect an
unwelcome evolution in the use of insurgents. However, State sponsorship of non-
state armed groups is not a new phenomenon. Prior to World War II, a proxy war
was fought in Spain between Germany and the Soviet Union. Germany's fascist
allies were led by General Franco, who battled the Soviet-backed Republicans in
the Spanish Civil War. 141 Since 1946 there have been at least thirty-two cases of
external participation by States in internal conflicts.142 Another report estimates
that from 1991-2000, State support played a significant role in forty-four
insurgencies. 143
Also, non-state armed groups achieved greater strategic and transnational
capabilities as a result of U.S.-Soviet proxy conflicts during the Cold War.'" In
the post-Cold War era, transitional or declining States are breeding grounds of
lawless, ungovemed areas ripe for control by armed groups. 1
45
State support is not limited to specific geographic locations or to specific
causes. Governments have supported groups in Asia, Africa, Europe and the
Middle East. 146  The reasons behind State support include gaining regional
influence, destabilizing neighbor States, payback, regime change, influencing the
opposition, internal security, prestige, supporting co-religionists, supporting co-
140. General Casts Doubt, supra note 102.
141. Adel Darwish, Hezbullah and Israel: The Proxy War, MIDEASTNEWS.COM, July 2006,
http://www.mideastnews.com/Lebanon06july.html. Darwish compares the Spanish Civil War to the
July War of 2006 in Lebanon, where he argues that the United States did combat against Syrian and
Iran through Israel and Hezbollah, respectively. See id.
142. Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset, 39 J. PEACE RES. 615,
620 (2002). Version 4-2006 of the dataset is based on changes described in Lotta Harbom et al., Armed
Conflict and Peace Agreements, 43 J. PEACE RES. 617, 617-31 (2006).
143. TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 9.
144. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 29 (citing THOMAS P.M. BARNETT, THE PENTAGON'S NEW MAP:
WAR AND PEACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 43-46 (2004).
145. SHULTZ, TIER ONE, supra note 5, at 8. See also S.C. Res. 405, supra note 8.
146. TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 17.
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ethnics, irredentism, leftist ideology, and plunder. 147
Hezbollah, the Iraqi insurgents, and Hamas all have strong militant wings, but
their primary weapon against their host State is not the use of force. Not
surprisingly, most datasets that track armed conflicts do not consider the type of
support that Iran gives these groups either because a.) an open conflict resulting in
casualties has not yet emerged, b.) Iran's military support is not direct and is
therefore not taken into account, or c.) political and social support intended to
undermine sitting governments is not considered. In fact, two separate datasets that
track State support of insurgencies, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) dataset of 2006148 and
the Rand Report of 2001149 focus on casualties and military effectiveness when
States support rebel groups. A leading expert in non-state armed groups, Richard
H. Shultz, also argues that despite political aspirations, armed groups will always
be defined by their underlying militancy. 150 Iranian support may prove to be the
exception to these standards, and it may be establishing an emerging norm.
Several aspects of Iranian-backed armed groups require closer examination to
determine whether they are indeed breaking new ground. These include the
creation of a State within a State, the non-violent infiltration of the political
system, gaining public support by providing services and financial assistance, and
training forces and maintaining an active intelligence branch. Many other State-
supported armed groups share some of these traits with the Iranian-backed groups,
but none combine them without the underlying threat of armed force to the target
State.
First, both Hezbollah and Mahdi's Army have created a State within a State in
Lebanon and Iraq, respectively. Hezbollah controls most of southern Lebanon,
while Mahdi's Army controls Sadr City in Baghdad and poor, rural areas in
southern Iraq. This aspect of their threat to the target State is not in itself unique.
In Colombia, for example, approximately half of the State's territory has been
abandoned by the government for decades and is controlled by multiple armed
groups. 151 Similarly, in Nepal, Maoist rebels effectively control and run a parallel
government from a large area of the State.
52
The distinction between Hezbollah and Mahdi's Army, and the Colombian
insurgents and Maoist Rebels is outside State support. While the Colombian
insurgents receive minor support from Venezuela and Cuba,153 this support is
147. Id. at 23-40.
148. See generally Harbom et al., supra note 142. For the dataset itself, see CENTRE FOR THE
STUDY OF CIVIL WAR, PRIO, ARMED CONFLICTS VERSION 4-2006 (2006), http://new.prio.no/CSCW-
Datasets/Data-on-Armed-Conflict/UppsalaPRIO-Armed-Conflicts-Dataset/Armed-Conflicts-Od-
Versions/Armed-Conflicts-Version-4-2006/.
149. See TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 31.
150. See Shultz, Armed Groups, supra note 9, at 10.
151. SHULTZ, TIER ONE, supra note 5, at 9.
152. BBCNEwS, Nepal Maoists disband government, Jan. 18, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia16273535.stm.
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limited and does not significantly affect the outcome of the conflict. There is no
indication that the Maoist rebels receive any form of outside State support. 1
54
Second, another key aspect of Iranian-backed armed groups is their political
achievements. Hezbollah and Mahdi's Army succeeded in creating their parallel
governments, in part, by earning seats in the sitting government's parliament.
Similarly, the electoral victory for Hamas in January 2006 means that Hamas did
not need to use force to take power in the Palestinian Territories - they won it
through popular support. While the militant wings of each of these groups remains
a large part of their operations, it is the legitimacy of their political wings and their
ascension to power that most undermines many analysts' reliance on violence as
the measuring stick for insurgent activity.
An historical analogy to a non-violent political takeover is the Anschluss of
Austria by Germany in 1938. The Nuremberg Tribunal found that Nazi-leaders
committed aggressive acts against Austria. 155  The annexation of Austria by
Germany was committed "without the use of armed force: internal subversive
actions and the immediate threat of extreme violence assured in these cases the
'peaceful co-operation' of the governments concerned."' 156 Other insurgent groups
with outside State support have similarly entered into, or taken over, a target
State's political apparatus. Uganda and Rwanda's support of insurgents to
overthrow the Mobutu regime in the Congo is an example. 157  The distinction
between this case and Iranian-supported armed groups is that Hezbollah, Mahdi's
Army, and Hamas did not win political support by threatening their respective
governments with overwhelming force. Even though armed groups by their very
nature do not follow democratic rules, they do seek to take full advantage of their
adversaries who do.' 58 By getting involved with, or actually taking over, the
political apparatus of a State, the Iranian-backed armed groups benefit from
legitimate power, which they can exercise through State institutions that are still
intact - unlike the aftermath of a violent coup.
Third, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Mahdi's Army have all skillfully used much of
their financial resources to fund vast socioeconomic networks, increasing their
influence among the public. 159 This is perhaps the single most important aspect of
the effectiveness of these groups, and the implementation of Iran's strategy. Other
insurgent groups tend to exert their influence over local populations, raising money
by collecting taxes or engaging in illicit criminal enterprises. Examples of these
practices are groups such as Columbia's FARC, the Revolutionary United Front
154. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist,
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?grouplD=353 1.
155. Judgment, Trial of the Major War Criminals: Before the International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, I I.M.T. 171, 186, 194, Nov. 14, 1945-Oct. 1, 1946.
156. DR. C.A. POMPE, AGGRESSIVE WAR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 21 (1953).
157. TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 33. Other examples include Pakistan's
support of the Taliban to topple the Rabbani government in Afghanistan and Russia ousting the United
Tajik Opposition-led government in Tajikistan. Id.
158. SHULTZ, TIER ONE, supra note 5, at 13-14.
159. TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 87.
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(RUF) in Sierra Leone, Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, and the Turkish Kurdistan
Worker's Party (PKK). 160 By nurturing public support, the Iranian-backed groups
enlist the loyalties of the community, increasing cooperation with their efforts, and
providing a ready supply of recruits for their cause. They are also ensured a
territorial base of operations.
Fourth, the Iranian-backed armed groups benefit from the training and
intelligence capabilities of the IRGC's Quds force. In particular, Tehran's forces
turned Hezbollah into a formidable armed force with expert intelligence-gathering
capabilities. 161  Hamas and Mahdi's Army will similarly benefit from recent
cooperation with Iran's trainers. The Quds force was created in the early 1980s
with the intent of carrying out Iran's foreign policy - which, at the time, included
training the Badr Organization to carry out attacks against Iraq.,
62 Today they
continue to assist Iraqi insurgent groups gather and manipulate 
intelligence. 163
While other States certainly provide training to insurgents - Pakistan is a standout
example 164 - it is uncertain whether the assistance, especially the intelligence
aspect, is as widespread or effective as that offered by the IRGC. In fact, many
insurgent groups act as sources of intelligence for their sponsor States.' 
65 Iran, on
the other hand, provides specialized training to its sponsor groups in order to
gather and manipulate intelligence for their independent operations. 
166
These four aspects of Iranian support highlight the sophisticated nature of its
strategy. Even though these groups started as militant organizations, their militant
wings do not play the dominant role in undermining their host State as in most
insurgencies. A primary example of a force-based insurgency is the RUF in Sierra
Leone, sponsored by Charles Taylor's former government in Liberia. The RUF
was no more than an armed militia, plundering and pillaging at will, even though
they tried to have a veneer of respect. 167 While not all state-sponsored insurgent
groups are as rudimentary as this, none reach the same level of sophistication as
Iranian-backed groups. This strategy allows Iran to avoid public scrutiny and,
therefore, accountability for violations of international law.
IV. INDIRECT AGGRESSION, IRANIAN RESPONSIBILITY, & POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Iranian support of non-state armed groups should be considered an act of
aggression in violation of international law. In order to make this determination, it
160. Id.
161. Id. at 92. Hezbollah effectively established espionage rings to operate inside Israel after the
withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon in 2000. SHAUL SHAY, THE AXIS OF EVIL: IRAN, HIZBALLAH,
AND PALESTINIAN TERROR 141-42 (2005).
162. RADIO FREE EUROPE, Iran: Expert Discusses Iran's Quds Force and U.S. Charges
Concerning Iraq, Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2007/02/iraq-
070216-rferl0l.htm. In fact, the Iranian Quds force was active in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Iraq
throughout the 1980s and '90s to undermine Saddam Hussein's regime, Bosnia in the early 1990s, and
Sudan in the early 1990s. Id.
163. Id.
164. TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 92.
165. Id. at 98.
166. RADIO FREE EUROPE, supra note 162.
167. SHULTz, TIER ONE, supra note 5, at 24.
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is necessary to briefly discuss the history and modem legal norms governing the
jus ad bellum.
A. Jus Ad Bellum & State Aggression Generally
The laws governing the initiation of armed conflict are considered thejus ad
bellum. 168 This area of law has a rich history dating back to the early Christian and
Islamic teachings, which became known as the "just war" theory. 169 During the
twentieth century, jus ad bellum began to take shape through resolutions passed by
the League of Nations 170 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 171 These treaties sought to
prohibit the aggressive use of force between States in order to promote peace and
security. 172
Today, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits member States from using
aggressive force as an extension of foreign policy. This provision states:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations. 1
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The Security Council declared, for the first and only time, that a member
committed aggression, or "a breach of the peace" as it were, when North Korea
invaded South Korea in 1950.174 Non-state armed groups can also commit
aggression, as indicated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 405 of 1977.'5
Under Resolution 405, the Security Council used the term "aggression" with
regard to mercenaries who attacked Benin in 1977, but did not name the State that
sponsored the attack. '76
168. See Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello after September 11, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
905, 905 (2002). In contrast, the jus in bello, also known as international humanitarian law or the law
of war, governs the methods used to conduct armed conflict. See BRIAN OREND, MICHAEL WALZER ON
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170. See BROWNLIE, supra note 169, at 71-72, for a discussion of League Assembly resolutions
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(Roy Gutman et al. eds. 1999), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/crimes-against-
peace.html.
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174. S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (June 25, 1950).
175. S.C. Res. 405, supra note 8.
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The General Assembly adopted Resolution 3314 (GA Res. 3314) in 1974 in
order to assist the Security Council in determining when aggression is committed
by States.1 77  Aggression is defined in article 3 of GA Res. 3314 to include:
invasion or attack of armed forces of a State into another State's territory,
bombardment of another State's territory, blockades, an attack on the armed forces
of another State, violating the terms of an agreement between two States when one
State has agreed to allow the other's armed forces on its territory, and one State
allowing another State to use its territory to launch an attack against a third
State. 178  Most relevant to this discussion is article 3(g), which states that
aggression is committed by:
The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein. 1
79
While Iranian support of armed groups likely falls within this article, it is
important to recognize the two distinct acts of "indirect aggression" seen in article
3(g).
First, there is the sending of irregular troops, or non-state armed groups, to
another State.' 80 The actions of these groups can be directly attributed to the State
that sent them. This is a "form of direct aggression, in that the State is responsible
for the hostile act, performed by its de facto military corps."' 18' However, the
armed group must commit acts comparable to the "direct use" of force by a State -
both in terms of political independence and territorial integrity - in order for it to
be considered aggression. 1
82
Second, there is "substantial involvement," which includes: training,
equipping, supplying weapons or other equipment, granting economic or financial
aid, and making available or tolerating the use of a State's territory for operational
or supply activities for the armed group.'83
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) appears to identify with the first type
of "indirect aggression." In the 1986 Nicaragua v. United States case, the ICJ
stated that sending by a State of armed bands or groups is to be considered an
armed attack by that State when these attacks are equivalent to a true armed attack
performed by regular forces; the ICJ adds that mere supply of logistical support
would not be considered an act of aggression justifying an armed response.' 84
There must be "effective control" of the armed group for its actions to be
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imputable to a State. 185  The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) also considered State responsibility for
non-state actors in the Tadic decision. The Tadic court required "overall control
going beyond the mere financing and equipping of military operations," for there
to be State responsibility. 186
In addition to the "control" requirement, the ICJ accepted an
"acknowledgment" basis for State responsibility in the 1980 case, United States v.
Iran. In that case, the conduct of non-state actors, who took the American consular
staff in Tehran hostage, was attributable to Iran because of the adoption of this
conduct by the Khomeini government.187  Both the "control" and
"acknowledgement" basis for State responsibility have been adopted by the
International Law Commission as customary international law. 1
88
B. Does Iranian Support of Non-State Armed Groups Constitute Aggression?
Iran should be accountable for the unlawful acts of the armed groups it
sponsors. It is unlikely, however, that the actions of these armed groups - with the
exception of Hezbollah - are tantamount to State aggression. Under article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter and GA Res. 3314 it would seem that groups such as Hezbollah,
Mahdi's Army, and Hamas threaten either the territorial integrity or the political
independence of their host State or their neighbors with the direct and substantial
support of Iran. 189 The fact that these actions are done in a manner that is not
recognized as an unlawful action vis-A-vis a sovereign State is testament to Iran's
exploitation of the rule of law.
Iran's use of Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel fulfills the definition of
aggression under GA Res. 3314. Hezbollah in particular uses direct force against
Israel that is equivalent to the direct use of force by a State. This was evident in
the organization's acts during the July War of 2006.'90 Hezbollah and Hamas each
committed raids that involved the murder and kidnapping of Israeli Soldiers to start
the conflict. 191 This occurred with Iranian backing.' 92 Iran may, therefore, be
responsible for violating the territorial integrity of Israel by killing and kidnapping
IDF Soldiers on Israeli territory and through Hezbollah's launching of Iranian-
supplied rockets into Israel. 193 Hezbollah, while somewhat autonomous, would
not be the military and political force it is today without Iran's support. Moreover,
Iran may be responsible for Hezbollah and Hamas's aggressive acts toward Israel
185. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 65.
186. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1-A, Judgement, 145 (July 15, 1999).
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188. G.A. Res. 56/83, 8, 11, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83/Annex (Dec. 12, 2001).
189. U.N. Charter, supra note 174; G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 177, 3(g).
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192. Id. See also Makovsky, supra note 43.
193. There are two separate groups of rocket attacks to consider. First, those that came before the
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by acknowledging its efforts and reaffirming the goal of "elimination of the Zionist
regime."'94
Iran may also be committing aggression against Lebanon by threatening its
political independence. It is alleged that Hezbollah assassinated political
supporters of the Cedars Revolution with car bombs. 195 If true, this can only be
interpreted as a direct use of force intended to threaten the Lebanese
government. 19 6  Prime Minister Siniora has since refused to force Hezbollah to
disarm under the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1559. This leaves
Hezbollah's militant wing as the de facto armed force in Lebanon - the strength of
which is a result of Iranian weapons supplies. With twenty-six seats in Parliament
and total control over the public services and social structures in southern
Lebanon, it is not surprising that Hezbollah could stage massive protests in
December of 2006 that nearly toppled the current leadership. 197 Beirut has no
option but to allow Hezbollah to maintain its State within a State in southern
Lebanon.
The issue is whether there is an "effective control" or "acknowledgement"
basis for imputing Hezbollah's actions to Iran as required by the Nicaragua and
Hostage cases. 198 At least one analyst argues that Hezbollah is not fully reliant on
Iran. While there is no doubt that the organization originated and grew as a result
of Iranian support and that they share strategic goals, Hezbollah now seems to be
operating more independently. 199 Hezbollah certainly poses a threat to Lebanon's
political independence, but Iran may escape responsibility as long as it does not
acknowledge supporting Hezbollah's aggressive behavior.
The Iraqi insurgent groups, similarly, pose a threat in Iraq. Much like
Hezbollah, however, they have never openly committed attacks against their host
State. Their political aspirations are not per se illegal, nor are their open
denouncements of any U.S.-supported government in Iraq. While they are repeat
offenders of international humanitarian law, which could very well be attributable
to Iran, they are not likely candidates for current interpretations of aggressive
conduct toward a State. Iran, therefore, is able to act through its surrogates with
impunity.
C. Policy Considerations Relating to "Indirect Aggression"
Aggression must be considered in terms of modem day realities. Large scale
traditional wars are quickly becoming the exception rather than the norm. Threats
posed by "internal" or "indirect aggression," recognized in the early years after
194. Sean Yoong, Ahmadinejad: Destroy Israel, End Crisis, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Aug. 3,
2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/03/AR2006080300629.html.
195. Phares, supra note 47.
196. Id.
197. Shadid, supra note 36.
198. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 65 (June 27); U.S.
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, at 35 (May 24).
199. Fuller, supra note 27, at 143.
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WWII, should be considered a national security priority. 200 When determining
which acts constitute aggression, or what deterrence measures need implementing,
the primary objective must always be to protect "the State's independence as
such.,
20 1
In 1953, Dr. C.A. Pompe concluded that, "When statesmen to-day speak of
aggression they include in that concept every method, every action that can lead to
the destruction of the liberty or the loss of territory of a State. 20 2 He adds that the
territorial integrity and political independence of a State "must be seriously
endangered by the use of force if this is to deserve the qualification
'aggression.' 20 3
Under Pompe's definition, Iran's use of armed groups to target the political
independence of weaker States does not fit the classic model of aggression, and
could not be considered armed aggression warranting coercive self-defense
measures. He argues that "States cannot be allowed to answer with military
measures every kind of foreign support or influence on internal attacks against the
established political order and the legitimate government. 20 4 In contrast, others
contend that a causus belli to attack Iran already exists based on its use of armed
groups.20 5  This position is supported by GA Res. 3314 and subsequent
international case law which define State support of armed groups as aggression.20 6
Regardless of whether Iran's support to these groups can be classified as
"aggression," the use of force in this situation is short-sighted. While this paper
argues for a more expansive definition of aggression, particularly in relation to
threats against the political independence of States, the blunt use of force would be
a strategic mistake, highlighting the effectiveness of Iran's more sophisticated
methods. Irrespective of the legality of coercive self-defense measures, the
following section discusses a range of options available to target States of Iranian
aggression, as well as a deterrence framework to be employed by the international
community.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
DETERRENCE
It is uncertain whether Iran's support of non-state armed groups is tantamount
to aggression vis-A-vis these groups' host States. The need to deter Iran's conduct,
however, is clear. While coercive measures have been considered, these are
unlikely to be effective. For one, the use of force seems disproportionate to Iran's
more sophisticated, clandestine operations within the target States. As mentioned
200. POMPE, supra note 156, at 93.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 106.
204. Id. at 111.
205. Michael T. Klare, Three US Reasons to Attack Iran, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 27, 2007,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/MiddleEast/IB27AkO1 .html.
206. See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 177; Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 65 (June 27).
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above, outright armed force has not been Iran's policy. Rather, an equally
sophisticated and multi-faceted approach is required to deter Iran's foreign policy
objectives.
A. Applying the Incentive Theory
In analyzing the causes of war and drafting a deterrence framework, Professor
John Norton Moore applies his "incentive theory.
' 207 This approach, put simply,
balances the incentives affecting decision makers on whether or not to engage in
the aggressive use of force. It looks at three different levels, or "images," of
incentives: the individual, the form of government, and the international system of
deterrence. Even though the focus of this paper is not war as such, the incentive
theory is adaptable to Iran's lower-level aggression: support of non-state armed
groups.
The first image in the incentive theory is the individual. This encompasses
the regime elites in Iran, the leaders of the non-state armed groups it supports, and
the individual citizens that follow these groups.
The regime elites in Iran and the leaders of its non-state armed groups
currently have little incentive to cease their unlawful conduct in Lebanon, Iraq, and
the Palestinian Territories. For its part, Iran is able to externalize the cost of
subverting these governments onto the armed groups themselves. Furthermore,
Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad are enjoying a newfound sense of
regional power, particularly when Hezbollah is extremely popular after the July
War of 2006 against Israel, and the U.S.-led coalition is struggling to bring security
to Iraq.
208
Similarly, the leaders of Iranian-backed insurgent groups have little to fear as
long as they receive top-cover from the Islamic Republic. Nasrallah in Lebanon,
al-Sadr in Iraq, and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh in the Palestinian Territories all
enjoy popular support in their host States, as well as the cover of political
legitimacy.
An effective way to curb the unlawful and subversive activities of these
groups is through international criminal law. Each of these groups has committed
war crimes and crimes against humanity; for example: Hezbollah's murdering and
kidnapping IDF Soldiers and launching rockets into civilian populations, 20
9 the
murder of civilians through Mahdi's Army death squads, 210 and Hamas' suicide
bombings of Israeli civilians.2 ' Iran is a major sponsor of each of these groups'
criminal endeavors. In fact, Human Rights Watch cited Iran for giving substantial
financial and logistical support to Hamas' suicide bombing campaign. 21 2 For these
207. See generally JOHN NORTON MOORE, SOLVING THE WAR PUZZLE (2004).
208. Barry Rubin, Iran: The Rise of a Regional Power, 10 THE MIDDLE EAST R. INT'L AFF., Sept.
2006, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jvl0no3al 0.html.
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211. Human Rights Watch, Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians
64, HRW Index No. 2807, Oct. 2002.
212. Id. at 96.
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actions, the leaders of Iran and the insurgent groups should be held individually
responsible. Effective punishment for blatant violations of international law would
serve as a strong disincentive to continue their unlawful practices.
The individuals who follow Iranian-backed armed groups equally need
disincentives. Hezbollah and Mahdi's Army, in particular, receive unwavering
public support from the local population primarily because they provide social and
financial assistance that the State cannot. This, and their appeal to disenfranchised
Shi'a groups through the idea of armed resistance, has effectively won over the
"hearts and minds" of their people. 213  In regard to the war on terror, some
commentators argue that the international community, especially the United States,
has done little to wage a "war of ideas" in the region.214 Unfortunately, the United
States has little credibility in the Islamic world.215
The Iranian population, similarly, has not been effectively engaged in the
"war of ideas." This is unfortunate, since many Iranian reformists do not, in fact,
support Hezbollah's attempts to provoke Israel or the use of suicide bombings to
kill civilians. 216 It is worth noting that the relationship between Tehran and
Hezbollah cooled - albeit slightly - during the presidency of reformist Muhammad
Khatami. 217  Similarly, in the Palestinian territories, there is at least some
indication that the Palestinian people will not suffer a radical, militant government.
At least one commentator noted that, "The Palestinians did not vote for Hamas so
that it could destroy Israel, but so that it could deal with security, corruption, the
schools, and the water supply.
218
In an effort to win the ideological struggle, the United States and the Western
world need to stay behind the scenes. They must, however, cultivate the moderate
population by discretely offering support to writers, scholars, journalists, and other
intellectuals in the region who also advocate a non-violent, more moderate
approach.21 9
The second image in the incentive theory is the form of government. In terms
of waging major wars, empirical evidence proves that democracies are far less
likely to be the aggressor. 220 Further evidence reveals that non-democracies are
more likely to have slower economic growth, commit crimes against humanity
(including genocide), suffer famines, support terrorism, be corrupt, be involved
with narcotics trafficking, have higher levels of refugee flows, have higher infant
213. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 4.
214. William Rosenau, Waging the "War ofIdeas, " in THE MCGRAw-HILL HOMELAND SECURITY
HANDBOOK 1131, 1138-39 (2006).
215. Id. at 1141. Although Rosenau focuses his analysis on the al Qaeda organization, the lack of
an effective ideological campaign is felt in the broader region.
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mortality rates, and have fewer women's rights.221
Many of these problems are seen in Iran's non-democratic theocracy. For
example, in 2004 Iran received a score of 6.1 out of 10 on the economic freedom
index, ranking 80 out of 130 countries surveyed.222 These results are in spite of
Iran's wealth of natural resources. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic has a history
of discrimination towards groups such as the Turkic communities2 23 and
women. 224 The State also employs extreme censorship measures, particularly the
state filtering system regulating the internet, rivaling that found in China.
225
Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian Territories are all fertile ground for Iran's
policy objectives.226 Weak states are chronically prone to insurgent groups that
challenge their authority.227 This plays into the larger struggle in the Middle East
between an attempt at democratization and a new, re-energized resistance front.
The main players are the United States and Iran on either side. It is hoped that,
"Political integration of the Islamist parties is aimed at moving them away from
violence and at preventing terrorism from drawing justification from the political
frustrations of the populations of the Middle East., 228 With their popular support
and abundant resources, the Iranian-backed insurgent groups must be encouraged
to end their violent, extremist methods and move toward legitimate political and
social endeavors. The State governments, meanwhile, must be given the means to
prosecute and dismantle any unlawful militant groups in their territory.229
The third image in the incentive theory is the international system of
deterrence. Effective deterrence can be defined as "a state of mind of the potential
aggressor based on perceptions of an aggregation of external incentives. 23 °
In order to deter the unlawful actions of the Iranian-backed armed groups, the
international community must act cooperatively to supply the sitting governments
with tools necessary to eliminate the militant wings of these groups through
stringent law enforcement. Simultaneously, heavy diplomatic and economic
pressure must be put on Iran, the sponsor of these groups. This can be done in
several ways.
First, the United Nations must follow through on the sanctions regime
imposed on Iran. In March 2007, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1747, which provides for Iranian cooperation with the International
221. Id. at 60.
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Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), bans arms exports from Iran, calls for an end to
new loans, and freezes the assets of key Iranian leaders. 23' The sanctions imposed
in December 2006 in Security Council Resolution 1737 were followed by 150
members of the 290 strong Iranian Majlis (parliament) signing a letter blaming
Iran's current fiscal woes on President Ahmadinejad.232 This is an indication that
external pressure is having an effect.
Second, individual States should put pressure on Iran. For example, the U.S.
Treasury Department banned Bank Saderat from the U.S. financial system in
September 2006.233 Pressure from the international community, such as the joint
statement issued by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in conjunction with
Egypt, Jordan and six other gulf States warning Iran, has impacted internal politics
of the Islamic Republic.234 Similarly, the recent designation of the IRGC as a
terrorist organization by the United States will put financial pressure on Iran's elite
military unit and primary trainer and intelligence provider to outside armed
groups.
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Third, pressure must be put on the groups Iran supports. A success story is
the U.S. Treasury designation of Jihad al-Bina - Hezbollah's construction
company in Lebanon.236 This shut the firm out of the international financial
system. Consequently, lenders and donors will not run the risk of rebuilding
Lebanon through Hezbollah, rather than through the legitimate Lebanese
government. 2 37  According to the Treasury Department, "Jihad al-Bina receives
direct funding from Iran, is run by Hizbullah members, and is overseen by
Hizbullah's Shura Council, at the head of which sits Hizballah Secretary General
Hassan Nasrallah.
' 238
Finally, the United States should not be too quick to leave Iraq. Quite
frankly, an unstable Iraq without the presence of coalition forces will be wide open
to Iranian influence. Iran has already stated that the U.S. presence in the region is
their biggest security concern.239 As long as Iran is aware that there is a deterrent
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force in the region it will be less likely to commit even more heinous crimes.
B. Conclusion
Iran's support of non-state armed groups is an effective method to achieve its
foreign policy objectives. By subverting governments in the region through the
cultivation of these dual political and militant organizations, Iran is able spread its
particular form of Shi'a influence.
Compared to other State supporters, Iran's use of insurgent groups is more
sophisticated and less likely to draw the rebuke of the international community.
Drawing upon public support, Hezbollah, the Iraqi insurgents, and Hamas have
effectively established parallel governments to their host States, gained a foothold
within the legitimate political apparatus, ingratiated themselves with the local
populations with an attractive revolutionary ideology and extensive social services,
and utilized the expertise of the IRGC's Quds force intelligence and training
capabilities.
These actions alone are not enough to meet the standards of unlawful
aggression under accepted interpretations of jus ad bellum law. Other conduct,
such as the attacks against Israel by Hezbollah and Hamas, could very well be
imputed to Iran as aggression, but the political and social subversion of the sitting
governments in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian Territories does not in itself
warrant coercive self-defense measures. This does not mean, however, that Iran is
not violating international law or that the international community is helpless to
effectuate change.
Incorporating the incentive theory to Iran's unlawful activity is an effective,
multifaceted approach to dealing with a cunning threat. There is a large moderate
population in the region that needs cultivating and support so that the ideologies of
violence and hate do not continue to hold sway. The leaders that support the
undermining of legitimate governments must be held accountable. Encouraging
democratic reform, while maintaining economic pressure, is certain to have a
deterrent effect on the bankrupt policies of Iran and the unlawful armed groups it
supports.
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